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Executive Summary
The pro-democracy protests of  the Moroccan Spring provided the national media with an 
open season that could not last long. Then, entrenched ‘untouchable’ topics were debated 
in the public realm, including those related to the King’s centralised power; today, jour-
nalists work in a climate of  control over the media fuelled by anti-terrorism slogans and 
the popularisation of  the model of  the journalist as defender of  the status quo, in the 
name of  ‘patriotism’.
The Moroccan national media witnessed several short phases of  openness, which could 
not survive the regime’s tactics and its adoption of  a hostile stance towards media free-
dom. These controlled phases of  media openness were sporadic and could not provide 
sustainable conditions to consolidate new investigative practices among journalists. 
Despite a new political dynamism, the great diversification of  topics tackled by journalists, 
and the development of  investigative reporting on citizens’ daily problems and needs, the 
resilience of  constitutional taboos – the monarchy, Islam and the territorial integrity of 
the kingdom – made the impact of  these developments limited.
Essential media rights are recognised by the new Moroccan constitution of  2011, but 
lack clear definition, are short of  international standards and are often negated by the 
many exceptions to them. Frequent legal cases against journalists, on the basis of  libel or 
anti-terrorism dispositions, act as strong instruments to deter journalists from challenging 
entrenched taboos. 
Moral denigration of  critical journalists and rights activists – via legal cases based on pri-
vate affairs or media spin – is used as a recipe to reduce them to silence and to isolate them 
socially. The use of  legal sanctions and economic boycotts against independent media 
projects means that these projects are unsustainable.
The political and ideological polarisation of  the national media acts as a double-edged 
sword: while it is widening the scope of  diversity of  views and invigorating plurality in the 
public space, it is exacerbating the use of  the national media for spin and rumours, with 
the race for the sensational becoming a major feature of  media production. 
Continuous shifts and mutations in the traditional national media are aggravating the 
fragility of  journalists’ already volatile working conditions. The lack of  opportunities for 
professional advancement and weak job stability are encouraging a wave of  migration to 
other professions.
Today, self-censorship habits are widespread, and journalists fear retribution not only for 
what they produce but also for their political views. With media investment linked to polit-
ical and ideological agendas, engagement in support of  democratic values is not a priority 
for Moroccan journalists.
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Key Findings
• The new constitution consecrated some basic media rights. However, the wide gap 
between written constitution and practice makes the process of  media liberalisation 
an incoherent one, with contradictory trajectories.
• The resilience of  ‘sacred’ taboos limits investigative reporting to politically correct 
topics, away from those at the heart of  power. The lack of  a regulatory structure that 
protects the informal media openness makes it a fragile structure, prey to the regime’s 
tactics.
• The new dynamism in the political sphere is reflected in media polarisation, acting as 
a mirror of  the struggle between conservative and modernist trends in Moroccan so-
ciety. Although it widens diversity in media output, this polarisation is fuelling trends 
towards populism and sensationalism.
• Investigative reporting cannot realistically thrive in the current environment of  media 
control. The combination of  legal sanctions, exorbitant fines and economic boycotts 
acts as a serious impediment to independent reporting. Entrenched habits of  self-cen-
sorship and fear of  change among journalists make them reluctant to move beyond 
reverential reporting.
• The use of  moral denigration against critical journalists and civil rights activists, 
through legal cases based on private affairs, largely viewed as politically motivated, 
muzzles critical reporting. The reputational damage suffered by these journalists can 
be more effective than prison sentences in silencing them.
• Social media and online news contribute to countering the hegemonic discourse 
of  traditional media, with some Facebook pages being used as vehicles for political 
change. However, the use of  these platforms for the regime’s propaganda, defamation 
and spreading of  rumours also puts in question their role as an engine of  democratic 
change.
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Introduction
The development of  the Moroccan media industry mirrors the historical, political and 
social dynamics in the country. The history of  the Moroccan media indicates an endemic 
instability, with sporadic cycles of  openness and closure, depending on the regime’s toler-
ance and its need to survive modernisation challenges.
The 2011 pro-democracy protests of  the 20 February movement injected a new energy 
into the Moroccan national media, encouraging journalists to debate and to challenge 
historical constitutional taboos. However, the limited scope and impact of  this movement 
hampered the consolidation of  these trends. The recent ongoing crackdown on critical 
reporting is reducing journalists again to self-censorship. The frequent use of  legal cases 
against media staff  and organisations, with hefty fines and prison sentences, continues to 
act as a muzzle on freedom of  expression and the press.
Traditionally reverential in dealing with the ‘sacred’ topics of  the monarchy, Islam and 
territorial integrity, the Moroccan media have witnessed rapid development in recent 
decades, diversifying content and operations, moving from an ideological and official tone 
to a newsy one, and allowing greater representation of  citizens’ everyday problems. The 
expansion of  commercial radio contributed to a widening of  the scope of  debate on social 
issues that used to be considered untouchable. However, this development is hindered by 
the ambivalent attitude of  the regime to freedom of  expression, opening and closing the 
window of  expression depending on the political requirements of  each phase in order to 
guarantee the continuity of  the status quo.
This report on Moroccan media and democratisation is part of  the ‘Arab National Media 
and Politics: Democracy Revisited’ project, examining the relationship between Arab tra-
ditional mass media and the political sphere within the remit of  political change in the 
Arab world, enabled by the popular Arab uprisings that erupted from 2010 on. Based on 
in-depth field investigation, the report aims to analyse the intricate relation between the 
national media and democratisation, mapping trends in the national media by reflecting 
on the lived experiences of  journalists and their perception of  their roles and practices. 
The report looks especially at journalists’ approach to entrenched taboos and the dynam-
ics of  censorship and self-censorship in newsrooms. It is based on the outcome of  a series 
of  qualitative interviews conducted in Morocco in July 2015 with more than 30 journalists 
and stakeholders in mainstream media, both print and audio-visual.
The report aims to extend and complement policy work on the impact of  the political 
change on the traditional national media, and on the role played by the national media 
in consolidating or weakening the democratisation processes. The role of  the mass media 
in supporting or stifling fragile processes of  change towards a democratic order has occa-
sioned ample scholarly work.1 According to classic normative theories of  the press, four 
1  See: W. L. Bennett, ‘The Media and Democratic Development: The Social Basis of  Political Com-
munication’, in P. O’Neil (ed.), Communicating Democracy: The Media and Political Transitions (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 1998). Richard Gunther and Anthony Mughan (eds), Democracy and the Media: A Com-
8 Moroccan National Media: Between Change and Status quo 
core-normative roles are fulfilled by journalists,2 namely a monitorial, a facilitative, a rad-
ical and a collaborative role. These roles are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but they 
reflect the diversity of  roles journalism can play in society.3 While the monitorial role is 
often considered as pivotal in countering hegemonic discourse, the implementation of  this 
liberal notion of  a watchdog role faces several constraints during fragile phases of  political 
transformations and may lead to further fragmentation and antagonism, thus transform-
ing the media into an instrument for competing political forces.4
This report complements previous research produced by the author investigating the 
interplay between traditional national media and political transitions in Tunisia, Libya 
and Egypt. This project is run in collaboration with the American University in Dubai. 
It is funded by the Middle East Centre at the London School of  Economics through the 
Emirates Foundation Academic Collaboration with Arab Universities Programme.
Constitutional Changes and the 20 February Movement
Inspired by the waves of  popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, the pro-democracy 
protests of  the 20 February movement in 2011 were triggered by interactions between 
tech-savvy Moroccan youngsters and street activists using social network activity5 and 
Facebook groups.6 Protesters were united around the two major demands of  ending 
corruption and ending despotism.7 The movement was joined by the most powerful Islamic 
parative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Vicky Randall, ‘The Media and 
Democratization in the Third World’, Third World Quarterly 14/3 (1993), pp. 625–46. Thomas Skidmore 
(ed.), Television, Politics and the Transition to Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press, 1993). Katrin Voltmer, The Media in Transitional Democracies (Cambridge: Polity, 2013). Silvio 
Waisbord, ‘The Mass Media and Consolidation of  Democracy in South America’, Research in Political 
Sociology 7 (1995), pp. 207–27.
2  Clifford G. Christians, Theodore L. Glasser, Denis McQuail, Kaarle Nordenstreng and Robert A. 
White, Normative Theories of  the Media: Journalism in Democratic Societies (Urbana, IL: University of  Illinois 
Press, 2009).
3 Fatima El-Issawi and Bart Cammaerts, ‘Shifting Journalistic Roles in Democratic Transitions: Les-
sons from Egypt’, Journalism, 12 April 2015.
4 Katrin Voltmer, ‘Building Media Systems in the Western Balkans: Lost between Models and Reali-
ties’, Analitika Working Paper 10/2013 (Sarajevo: Analitika Center for Social Research, 2013), p. 22.
5 A video by an unknown young activist, calling for Moroccan young people to take to the streets for 
change, went viral on social media. Faced with campaigns of  defamation by the media, the movement 
produced many YouTube videos in which young activists talk about their demands for a democratic con-
stitution and greater social equality. See, for example, ‘Inside the Movement: What is Left of  Morocco’s 
February 20?’Available at http://www.middleeasteye.net/in-depth/features/what-left-morocco-s-feb-
ruary-20-movement-857852436 (accessed 17 February 2016).
6 The main Facebook page behind the movement was called ‘Moroccans Converse with the King’ and 
later took the name ‘Freedom and Democracy Now’.
7 Lahcen Achy, Rachid Touhtou and Mohemed el Hachimi, ‘State and Civil Society in Morocco: Assess-
ing the Arab Spring Effect’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 17 July 2012. Available at http://
carnegieendowment.org/2012/07/17/state-and-civil-society-in-morocco-assessing-arab-spring-ef-
fect/duk1 (accessed 17 February 2016).
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opposition group, the banned Justice and Charity group (Al Adl Wal Ihsan), and a few 
radical left parties marginalised in the political sphere.8 The inability of  the movement’s 
heterogeneous ideological currents to define a ceiling for their demands was its major 
weakness, although the main demands9 centred on the establishment of  a parliamentary 
monarchy and the revision of  the unlimited powers granted to the King,10 expressed by 
the slogan ‘the King reigns but does not rule [the country]’. According to the constitution, 
the King is Amir al-Muʾminin (‘Commander of  the Faithful’) as well as ‘the supreme repre-
sentative of  the nation and the symbol of  unity’ and ‘the guarantor of  the perpetuation 
and the continuity of  the state’.11 The notion of  elmakhzen,12 the popular appellation in 
reference to the monarchy, is symbolic of  the centralised authority and powers exercised 
by the King and his entourage with no means of  accountability.13
In response to the popularity of  the movement, King Mohammed VI announced, in 
a historic speech of  9 March 2011, a constitutional reform process promising radical 
reforms that responded to most of  the protesters’ demands. By so doing, he managed to 
co-opt the protest movement by taking the debate on democratic change from the streets 
to the palace.14 On 1 July 2011, the revised constitution was voted in by an overwhelming 
majority (98.49 per cent of  votes) in a national referendum, despite calls by the 20 Febru-
ary movement to boycott it.15 For the movement, the proposed reforms neither challenged 
the political system nor dismantled its authoritarian structure.16 The adoption of  the new 
constitution was guaranteed by the strong support of  mainstream political parties, trade 
unions and the overwhelmingly enthusiastic media.
The 2011 constitution was seen by many as a big leap towards the independence of  the 
judiciary and the recognition of  human rights,17 as it covers a wide array of  fundamental 
8 Samia Errazzouki, ‘Spin Cycle: Morocco’s Forgotten Reform Movement’, Sada Carnegie, 15 May 
2012. Available at http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2012/05/15/spin-cycle-morocco-s-forgot-
ten-reform-movement/d31g (accessed 17 February 2016).
9 See the official communiqué of  the movement’s launch and goals. Available at http://slailymoham-
med.blogspot.co.uk/2011/12/20.html (accessed 17 February 2016).
10 Mohamed Madani, Driss Maghraoui and Salma Zerhouni, The 2011 Moroccan Constitution: A Critical 
Analysis (Strömsborg: International institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2012). Available at 
http://www.idea.int/publications/the_2011_moroccan_constitution/loader.cfm?csModule=security/
getfile&pageid=56782 (accessed 17 February 2016).
11 Ibid., p. 11.
12 Best translated as the mechanism by which the King and the surrounding elite are able to control 
politics and the economy.
13 Madani et al., 2011 Moroccan Constitution.
14 Interview with writer and researcher Driss Ksikes, Rabat, July 2015.
15 ‘Morocco Approves Constitutional Reforms’, CNN, 1 July 2011. Available at http://edition.cnn.
com/2011/WORLD/africa/07/01/morocco.vote.reforms (accessed 17 February 2016).
16 Madani et al., 2011 Moroccan Constitution, p. 16.
17 Ellinor Zeino-Mahmalat, ‘Constitutional Reform and Constitutional Reality in Morocco: Between 
Monarchical Stability and Democratic Renewal’, KAS International Reports 2, 2014, pp. 113–47 at p. 114. 
Available at http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_36789-544-2-30.pdf ?140207134415 (accessed 17 Febru-
ary 2016).
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rights that were recognised for the first time.18 However, the constitution was criticised for 
the top-down, undemocratic drafting process and the continued concentration of  power 
in the hands of  the King.19 The King’s exclusive power in the three domains of  reli-
gion, security issues and strategic major policy choices is still preserved.20 This allows him 
to maintain his strong influence over the country’s religious, socio-cultural and political 
domains (Articles 41 and 42).21
Media Freedom: Between the Written Constitution and the 
Practice
Although the constitutional reforms were praised as progressive in terms of  media plu-
ralism, ownership and environment, they kept the historical constraints on so-called 
‘untouchable’ topics.22 Furthermore, the gap between the nominal and the actual prog-
ress, the legislation and the state’s attitude towards individuals or media organisations, 
remains a key issue. Although a number of  nominal freedoms exist, arbitrary court rulings 
have been used to stifle dissent.23
Some key advances were achieved in the field of  media liberalisation,24 embodied in Arti-
cles 25, 27 and 28, among others.25 Article 28 states that the ‘freedom of  the press is 
guaranteed and may not be limited by any form of  prior censure’. However, the law has 
the power to ‘set the rules of  organisation and control of  public means of  communication’, 
leaving space for the state to enforce repressive laws that would essentially conflict with the 
new constitution. The same article guarantees the free publication and dissemination of 
ideas and opinions within limits stipulated by the law. Article 27 grants citizens ‘the right 
of  access to information held by the public administration, the elected institutions and the 
18 New rights such as the right to freedom of  expression, the right to life and physical inviolability, and 
the right to petition, as well other economic and social rights, are enshrined in the new constitution.
19 Anja Hoffmann and Christoph König, ‘Scratching the Democratic Façade: Framing Strategies of  the 
20 February Movement’, Mediterranean Politics 18/1 (2013), pp. 1–22 at p. 16
20 The first organic law adopted by the parliament after the new constitution, on the power-sharing 
system between the head of  government and the King, defines 20 public institutions and 70 public 
enterprises as ‘strategic’, which means that the appointment of  their high officials can only be decided 
by the King.
21 Marina Ottoway, ‘The New Moroccan Constitution: Real Change or More of  the Same?’, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 20 June 2011. Available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/06/20/
new-moroccan-constitution-real-change-or-more-of-same/6g (accessed 17 February 2016).
22 ‘Morocco: Freedom of  the Press 2012’, Freedom House. Available at https://freedomhouse.org/
report/freedom-press/2012/morocco (accessed 17 February 2016).
23 Naomi Sakr, Arab Television Today (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007), p. 47.
24 Aarab Issiali, ‘Liberalization of  the Moroccan Broadcasting Sector: Breakthroughs and Limitations’, 
in Tourya Guaaybess (ed.), National Broadcasting and State Policy in Arab Countries (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013), pp. 131, 136.
25 Morocco, Constitution du 1er Juillet 2011. Available at mjp.univ-perp.fr/constit/ma2011.htm 
(accessed 17 February 2016).
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organs invested with missions of  public service’.26 However, this is limited by many restric-
tions, such as those relating to ‘national defence’ and ‘the internal and external security 
of  the State’.27 According to the terms of  the new constitution, public broadcasting media 
should provide greater visibility for the political opposition (Article 10), and this should 
specifically apply during elections and pre-electoral periods (Article 19).
While the new constitution provides larger guarantees to protect freedom of  expression, 
several subjects remain untouchable for media and public debate, mainly the monar-
chy, Islam, and territorial integrity in relation to the disputed status of  Western Sahara. 
Restrictions on media content related to tackling these topics are historical and embedded 
in various pieces of  legislation. Although the personality of  the King is no longer ‘sacred’ 
according to the new constitution, the integrity of  his person is ‘inviolable’ (Article 46).28 
Morocco’s 2005 law on audio-visual communication explicitly states that audio-visual 
programmes and material ‘must not be likely to cause prejudice to the dogmas of  the 
Kingdom of  Morocco as defined by the Constitution, especially those relating to Islam, 
the territorial integrity of  the Kingdom and the monarchy’.29
The vague wording of  the legal dispositions guaranteeing media freedom opens the door 
to their misuse and interpretation. Moreover, the continuous criminalisation of  libel 
offences in legal cases against journalists and media institutions, with exorbitant fines or 
prison terms, is frequently used to muzzle critical reporting.30
The Audio-Visual Regulations and Structures
The process of  liberalising the sector was launched with the decree law (no. 2-02-663) of 
September 2002, abolishing state monopoly over the audio-visual sector.31 The Société 
Nationale de Radiodiffusion et de la Télévision (SNRT) was established as a new corpo-
ration, consisting of  the already-existing Radio Télévision Marocaine (RTM) and Service 
Autonome de Publicité (SAP), whose capital is to be held entirely by the state.32 The 
SNRT currently controls the majority of  Moroccan TV channels on behalf  of  the state.
The Haute Autorité de la Communication Audiovisuelle (HACA)33 is recognised by the 
new constitution as the regulatory body in charge of  guaranteeing the application of  laws 
and regulations governing broadcasting media. According to Article 165, the body is 
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Morocco, Loi no. 77-03 sur la communication audiovisuelle (promulgué par le Dahir [royal decree] no. 1-04-257 
du 25 Kaâda 1425), 7 janvier 2005, Art. 9. 
30 ‘Morocco: Freedom of  the Press 2015’, Freedom House. Available at https://freedomhouse.org/
report/freedom-press/2015/morocco (accessed 17 February 2016).
31 Décret-loi no. 2-02-663 du 2 Rejeb 1423 (10 septembre 2002) portant suppression du monopole de l’etat en matière de radi-
odiffusion et de télévision. Available at http://euromedaudiovisuel.net/Files/2010/03/26/1269563837534.
pdf ?1269563862437 (accessed 17 February 2016).
32 Dahir no. 1-04-257, Title III, Chapter 2.
33 The HACA was created in 2002 by a Dahir, and was amended in 2003, 2007 and 2008.
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entrusted with guaranteeing ‘respect for pluralist expression of  the currents of  opinion 
and of  thought and of  the right to information’34 in media content and the media environ-
ment. As an independent body instituted by the new constitution, its terms of  governance, 
prerogatives and composition will be defined by an organic law (Article 171) that is yet to 
be drafted. The HACA was created as an ‘independent administrative authority’, though 
it remains under the ‘tutelary protection of  the King’.35 The Conseil Supérieur de la 
Communication Audiovisuelle (CSCA) is the HACA’s deliberative organ and consists of 
nine members. Five – including the president – are nominated by the King, two by the 
prime minister, and one each by the head of  each parliamentary chamber. The CSCA 
reaches decisions by majority rule. It enjoys large executive powers, mainly the adminis-
tration and the assignment of  broadcast licences.36
The establishment of  the HACA was met with criticism, mainly targeting its composi-
tion, which does not necessarily bring on board members with expertise in audio-visual 
regulation or related fields.37 Furthermore, no term limit was imposed on the members 
nominated by the King, while those appointed by the prime minister were constrained to 
a five-year term renewable once. Additionally, the monarch’s major role in the HACA’s 
functioning is seen as limiting its independence.38 The lack of  input from the professional 
community in the establishment of  this body is another important handicap.
The Press Code Reform: Lack of Political Will?
The current press code was reformed in 2002. Three law projects were presented by the 
new government in October 2014, covering a new press code, a new status for profes-
sional journalists and the formation of  a national council of  the press. Several repressive 
provisions are still embodied in the current press and penal codes, especially criminalising 
critical speech. The press code imposes prison sentences of  three to five years for speeches 
that are considered to be ‘undermining religion, the monarchy or territorial integrity’39 or 
that are offensive to ‘his Majesty the King, and the royal princes and princesses’.40 
The press code contains the terms ‘prison’ and ‘imprisonment’ 24 times.41 It does not pro-
vide a legal guarantee that journalists will be able to keep the identity of  their sources secret.42
34 The Constitution of  Morocco. Available at http://www.maroc.ma/en/content/constitution (accessed 
18 April 2016). 
35 Issiali, ‘Liberalization of  the Moroccan Broadcasting Sector’, p. 138.
36 Dahir no. 1-02-212 du 31 août 2002.
37 Ahmed Hidass, ‘Radio and Television in Morocco: New Regulation and Licensing for Private Chan-
nels’, Journal of  Arab & Muslim Media Research 3/12, 2010, pp. 19–36 at p. 30.
38 Sakr, Arab Television Today, pp. 21, 35.
39 ‘Morocco: Free Student Imprisoned for “Insulting King”’, Human Rights Watch, 6 July 2013. Available 
at http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/16/morocco-free-student-imprisoned-insulting-king (accessed 
17 February 2016).
40 Errazzouki, ‘Spin Cycle’.
41 Hatem al Batiwi, ‘The New Press Code Will Not Include Repressive Sanctions’, Al Sharq al Awsat, 
19 October 2014. Available at http://aawsat.com/home/article/204926 (accessed 17 February 2016. 
42 Ahmed Hidass, ‘Le Statut de Journaliste Professionnel au Maroc’, Les Cahiers du Journalisme 8, 2000, 
pp. 205–26 at p. 216.
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The new press code project was praised for several advances in the protection of  journal-
ists and the profession,43 especially reducing or eliminating punitive measures such as fines 
or incarceration. In particular, this applies to charges of  defamation, frequently used as 
a tool to intimidate critical journalists or simply to limit the media’s ability to tackle spe-
cific topics. However, the adoption of  the new press code is continually delayed, despite 
repeated calls from professionals to enact it. ‘No one really wants this new code, neither 
the government nor the political parties. It is too beautiful to be true’, comments Nadia 
Salah, director of  publications at Eco Médias, one of  the largest private media groups.44
However, these reforms are restricted by the persistence of  other means through which 
the authorities can pre-emptively censor the media. According to the draft press code, 
online publications must register with the Moroccan authorities in order to be able to 
diffuse audio or video on the internet. Judges are given the power to block, confiscate or 
prevent the diffusion of  certain media content.45 While the creation of  a national press 
council is an important step, the proposed text leaves a number of  sanctions to the legal 
system which could instead be administered by the council itself. The proposed definition 
of  ‘professional journalist’ is too restrictive and effectively excludes citizen journalists. The 
article on the protection of  sources’ confidentiality is not really effective, and freedom of 
access to information is limited by several exceptions.
Most importantly, the new draft press code does not abolish the restrictions on topics con-
sidered as taboo: Article 76 allows the banning of  publications that damage the Islamic 
religion, the King’s dignity or that of  the royal family, and the country’s national integrity. 
The vague wording of  regulations upholding ‘public order’ or ‘national security’ and lim-
iting press freedom may encourage journalists to self-censor in order to avoid retaliation.46
In addition to restrictions and punitive measures embedded in the current press code, 
other restrictions are included in the penal code and specific laws, especially the anti-ter-
rorism law. This adopts a broad definition of  terrorism and has been utilised to charge 
and jail journalists. The law endangers basic civil and political rights; offences such as 
‘encouragement of  terrorism’ and ‘praising’, ‘glorifying’ or ‘justifying’ terrorism are not 
clearly enough defined to ensure that they do not lead to unnecessary or disproportionate 
interference with freedom of  expression.47
43 ‘Observations de Reporters Sans Frontières Relatives aux Projets de Loi sur la Presse Marocaine’, 
Reporters Sans Frontières, 15 November 2014. Available at https://fr.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/112014rsf-projet-
pressemaroc.pdf  (accessed 17 February 2016).
44 Salah also talks about the continuous use of  lawyers and exorbitant related costs in order to avoid 
libel cases. Interview with author, Rabat, July 2015.
45 ‘Observations’, Reporters Sans Frontières.
46 ‘Observations’, Reporters Sans Frontières.
47 ‘Human Rights Abuses in the Fight against Terrorism’, Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de 
l’Homme, 15 July 2004. Available at https://www.fidh.org/International-Federation-for-Human-Rights/
north-africa-middle-east/morocco/Human-Rights-abuses-in-the-fight (accessed 17 February 2016).
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Legal cases against journalists are a major feature of  journalists’ environment. It is impos-
sible within the limits of  this report to list all legal cases against journalists on the basis of 
their professional activities. Most notorious are the conviction of  journalists Ali Anouzla, 
for publishing an article containing a link to a video by Al-Qaeda, and Rachid Nini, for 
criticising the government’s counterterrorism practices.48 The case of  the journalist Ali 
Lmrabet is special, as he was sentenced in 2005 to a 10-year ban from practising journal-
ism, on charges of  libel – an unprecedentedly harsh sanction on a journalist.49 Lmrabet 
had described Sahrawis living in camps in Algeria as ‘refugees’ rather than ‘captives’, the 
term used by the Moroccan government. Rachid Nini was sentenced in 2011 to one year 
in prison, the longest prison sentence implemented against a journalist in the country. He 
was tried and convicted of  disinformation, attacking state institutions, and ‘compromising 
the security and safety of  the homeland and citizens’.50 Anouzla is to stand a new trial over 
comments about the Western Sahara he allegedly made to the German press. He faces 
charges of  ‘undermining national territorial integrity’.51 
Other examples include that of  Youseff  Jajili, editor in chief  of  the weekly Alaan, who was 
given a two-month suspended prison sentence in June 2013 and a fine of  50,000 dirhams 
(US$6,000) for publishing an article in which he reported that a government minister had 
used public money to order alcohol while on a taxpayer-funded trip. Jajili was charged 
with criminal defamation.52 A report by the Moroccan Digital Rights Association on the 
spread of  citizen surveillance in the country led to the imposition of  charges of  ‘false 
denunciations’, ‘depreciating the efforts of  the state’ and ‘insulting the authorities’ against 
the vice president of  the Association, Karima Nadir.
The extremely high and disproportionate fines imposed on journalists and media outlets 
muzzle critical reporting. Suspended prison sentences are another powerful tool with which 
to intimidate journalists, as the regime can resort to implementing the sentence at any time.
48 ‘Moroccan Journalist to Face Trial after Criticising Counter-Terrorism Laws’, Freedom House, 30 April 
2011.
49 Being banned from practising a profession exists as a punishment in Article 87 of  Morocco’s Penal 
Code, though it had not been used against a journalist in recent memory before this case.
50 Cecily Hillarey, ‘The Case of  Rachid Nini: A Test of  Press Freedom in Morocco’, Voice of  America, 
21 June 2011. Available at http://www.voanews.com/content/the-case-of-rachid-nini-a-test-of-press-
freedom-in-morocco/158381.html (accessed 17 February 2016).
51 ‘Moroccan Journalist Faces Trial for Western Sahara Comments’, New Arab, 24 January 2016. 
Available at http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2016/1/25/moroccan-journalist-faces-tri-
al-for-western-sahara-comments (accessed 4 March 2016). 
52 ‘Morocco: Freedom of  the Press 2015’, Freedom House.
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The Media Landscape: Diversification, Growth and Polarisation
The Printed Press: A Dynamic Landscape
In contrast to the audio-visual sector, which is mainly state owned, the print sector is 
mainly private and partisan.53 It is estimated there are nearly 20 daily and more than 80 
weekly publications, most of  them privately owned.54 The party-owned press played a pri-
mary role in diversifying media content and in providing counter-narratives to the official 
media discourse. With its militant ideological tone, this press provided political parties 
with a platform from which to challenge the regime’s narratives.
This part of  the press is witnessing a sharp decline in readership and revenues with the 
rise of  a newsy, privately owned press, encouraged by the liberal economic trends and 
increased privatisation of  the early 1990s. The two most prominent new titles were 
L’Economiste and La Vie Economique.55
The development of  an investigative press, providing critical content that challenged 
taboos and relying mainly on advertising revenue, is solidly linked to the history of  the 
French-language weekly Le Journal or Le Journal Hebdomadaire,56 launched in 1997. This 
weekly publication pioneered investigative journalistic practices, publishing reports that 
angered the establishment.57 In 2000, Le Journal was banned after it published an inter-
view with the head of  the separatist Polisario Front. In 2010, Moroccan authorities closed 
down the weekly after a court ordered the publication to pay US$360,000 in fines at the 
outcome of  a defamation suit.58 The combination of  legal intimidation and economic boy-
cott led to the exile of  its editor and co-founder, the leading journalist Aboubakr Jamaï.59
Another important title in the history of  this investigative, elite francophone press is the 
news magazine Tel Quel,60 launched in 2000. The magazine adopted a liberal editorial line 
with a focus on challenging social taboos and defending the ideals of  a secular society. It 
was equally bold in challenging political taboos, such as tackling the topic of  the King’s 
salary.61 In 2006, the magazine launched a sister edition, Nichane, which uses the principal 
53 Hamza Tayebi, ‘The Independent Press after the “Moroccan Spring”’, Mathal 4/1, 2015, article 4. 
Available at http://ir.uiowa.edu/mathal/vol4/iss1/4 (accessed 17 February 2016).
54 ‘Morocco: Freedom of  the Press 2015’, Freedom House.
55 The French press magnate Jean-Louis Servan-Schreiber was at the head of  La Vie Economique by spe-
cial royal derogation and pushed it to rebel against habits of  self-censorship
56 Le Journal was closed and had to relaunch with a new title, Le Journal Hebdomadaire.
57 Tayebi, ‘Independent Press’.
58 ‘Free Speech under Attack in Morocco’, Freedom House, 4 February 2010. Available at https://free-
domhouse.org/article/free-speech-under-attack-morocco (accessed 4 March 2016).
59 Ibid.
60 The title’s slogan is ‘Le Maroc tel qu-il est’, meaning ‘Morocco as it is’, and not as it should be or as 
it is presented by the regime and official media discourse.
61 Tel Quel published a special investigation on the King’s salary. The article was widely cited in interna-
16 Moroccan National Media: Between Change and Status quo 
spoken language of  Morocco (Moroccan colloquial Arabic, or Darija); this weekly rapidly 
became the leading Arabic investigative platform. In 2007, Nichane was suspended for two 
months after it published an article on ‘how Moroccans joke about religion, politics, and 
sex’. The paper’s editor in chief, Driss Ksikes, and another journalist were convicted of 
‘offending the Islamic religion [and] the publication and the distribution of  writings con-
trary to morals and good customs’, and sentenced to three-year suspended prison terms.62 
In 2010, Nichane declared bankruptcy and closed, although scoring high distribution fig-
ures. Its financial failure may be attributable in part to an advertising boycott conducted 
against it.
Recent years have witnessed the decline of  the French-language press and the growth of 
Arabic-language dailies and weeklies. An important title was the daily Assabah, which set 
the model for other similar publications, providing a mixture of  politics, entertainment 
and sports news in Arabic. The experience of  the newspaper Al Massae is an example of 
this developing and fragile sector of  the ‘audacious’ press. Launched in 2007 by three 
prominent journalists, the daily was a major platform from which to publish reports that 
challenged the regime, such as investigations of  abuses and corruption among members 
of  the establishment and the security services. Other projects of  the investigative press 
include Al Jareeda al Okhra (‘The Other Journal’) and Al Jareeda al Oula (‘The First Jour-
nal’).63 These experiments could not establish a solid tradition of  independent reporting. 
The combination of  the use against them of  several tools, such as economic boycotts by 
advertisers, prison sentences and exorbitant fines, led to the bankruptcy and closure of 
most of  these projects.
With a limited number of  state-owned press outlets,64 the current press landscape is dom-
inated by large private media groups spanning dailies and weeklies as well as printing 
houses or radio stations, along with some few small-to-medium-sized press outlets. The 
Eco Médias group, founded in 1991, publishes two of  the previously mentioned dailies, 
namely L’Economiste (French) and Assabah (Arabic). It also owns Atlantic Radio and the 
monthly publications L’Economiste Magazine (French) and Majallat Assabah (Arabic). It has its 
own printing house, Eco-Print, and a college for training journalists. Another group, Médi 
Editions, publishes the daily Al Ahdath al Maghrebiya (Arabic) and the weekly L’Observateur du 
Maroc et d’Afrique (French) and owns Med Radio. A third group, Les Editions de la Gazette, 
publishes Challenge Hebdo (weekly economics magazine), VH Magazine (monthly magazine 
for men) and Lalla Fatéma (monthly magazine for women in Arabic). It owns MFM Radio.
tional media. See an article by the French daily Libération on this investigation by Tel Quel: José Garçon, 
‘“Pauvre” Roi Mohammed VI’, Libération, 4 January 2005. Available at http://www.liberation.fr/plan-
ete/2005/01/04/pauvre-roi-mohammed-vi_505022 (accessed 4 March 2016).
62 ‘Le Roi, les Islamistes et la Presse Libérale: Répercussions de l’Affaire des Blagues de Nichane au 
Maroc’, MEMRI.FR, 25 April 2007. Available at http://www.memri.fr/2007/04/25/le-roi-les-isla-
mistes-et-la-presse-liberale-repercussions-de-laffaire-des-blagues-de-nichane-au-maroc (accessed 17 
February 2016).
63 Independent journalist Ali Anouzla, interview with author, Rabat, July 2015.
64 The group Maroc Soir publishes the daily Le Matin and Maroc Soir (French) and Assahraa al Maghrebiyya 
(Arabic). Although the group is privately owned, the editorial line of  these publications represents the 
official voice of  the regime.
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Alongside these large groups, there are other small-to-medium projects such as the news-
paper Al Massae, with an editorial line close to the Islamic government;65 the newspaper 
Al Akhabar, a populist daily; and the daily Akhbar al Yom, adopting a liberal editorial line 
though friendly to the Islamic-led government. The partisan press constitutes a main 
pillar of  this landscape, despite very limited distribution and coverage, although it receives 
government subsidies.66
Audio-Visual Media: A Symbol of Sovereignty
The audio-visual sector is heavily dominated by the state. It is a symbol of  the regime’s 
sovereignty. The liberalisation of  the audio sector was strictly limited to the radio field; 
there are 18 private radio stations today, with limited political content.67 This partial 
liberalisation contributed to the diversification of  media content, especially in tackling 
controversial topics related to social taboos. The new stations reinvigorated pluralism 
and diversity in the audio-visual sector, especially through their live debates and news 
output. Their focus on local and national Moroccan topics as well as their special style in 
addressing audiences, mixing classical and colloquial Arabic, made them hugely popular, 
especially among young people.68
The television landscape is largely state owned and used as editorial support for the 
regime, although technically it is legal to establish privately owned television stations since 
the liberalisation of  the audio-visual sector. The state television landscape is composed 
of  eight national channels providing a mixture of  generalist and thematic output, led 
by the main two generalist channels: Al Aoula (the first SNRT channel to be established) 
and SOREAD 2M.69 A single private TV licence was granted by the HACA in 2006, in 
a process which was criticised for lacking transparency.70 The recipient of  the licence, the 
private channel Medi1TV, presents itself  as a generalist news, debate and entertainment 
channel.71 According to Article 21 of  the Audiovisual Communication Law, a company or 
a stakeholder cannot control more than one TV or radio station.
65 This newspaper owns a distribution company, Al-Wasset.
66 Bouziane Zain and Mohamed Ibrahine, ‘Mapping Digital Media: Morocco’, Open Society Foundations, 
30 May 2011, p. 63.
67 These are: RMI, SAWA, ATLANTIC, Radio Plus Agadir, Radio Plus Marrakech, MFM SAISS, 
MFM Souss, MFM ATLAS, MFM Sahara, MFM Oriental, Cap Radio, ASWAT, CHADA FM, HIT 
Radio, Radio Mars, Radio Luxe, Med Radio and Medina FM.
68 Zain and Ibrahine, ‘Mapping Digital Media’, p. 64.
69 The others are Arriyadia (sport), Assadissa (religion), Arrabia (education and culture), Aflam TV 
(films), Tamazight TV (generalist for the promotion of  Amazigh culture and language), and al-Magrib-
iyya (rediffusion of  main news bulletins of  the first and second channels). The channel Laayoune TV is 
a regional one, covering the southern provinces with generalist output.
70 ‘Project of  Statistical Data Collection on Film and Audiovisual Markets in 9 Mediterranean Coun-
tries. Country Profile 2: Morocco’, Euromed Audiovisuel, (Tunis: Euromed Audiovisual III/CDSU, 2012), p. 
41. Available at http://www.obs.coe.int/documents/205595/403403/euromed_MA_report_EN.pdf/
e38a595d-c805-40ad-a684-57b71b854705 (accessed 17 February 2016).
71 Ibid.
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Born as a private, thematic, encrypted channel with an international vocation in 1989, the 
second channel, SOREAD 2M, presents a unique model of  a TV channel which migrated 
from private to state ownership. The launch of  the channel was a strategic decision by the 
late King Hassan II to provide the regime with a modern face. The channel was initiated 
under the patronage system: the main stakeholder is the company managing the royal family 
wealth,72 and its director general is the King’s son-in-law. Conceived as an elite medium, 
the channel suffered from its economic model and was rebranded as a generalist, national 
terrestrial channel largely owned by the state in 1997.73 The TV channel introduced a revo-
lutionary change by pioneering debate programmes and modern news bulletins:
At that time, 95 per cent of  news was about the activities of  institutions. The 
citizen was absent. We tackled social taboos that no one could talk about such as 
single mothers or prostitution; giving voice to a figure from the opposition and to 
ordinary citizens’ demands was at that time a big revolution, 
explains Samira Sitail, head of  news and programmes at the channel,74 stressing that the 
launch of  the channel was a major tool of  the democratisation of  the country.
The public audio-visual sector is under the direct oversight of  the King. Before the 2011 
constitution, he used to appoint the head of  the state-owned media by royal Dahir. Under 
the new constitution, nominations to the post of  head of  the public media are exclusive to 
the King as concerning strategic institutions.75
The liberalisation of  the television sector is stalled, although the government announced 
the awarding of  new television licences in 2012.76 There were two rounds of  licence grant-
ing in 2006 and 2009, organised by the HACA for private TV and radio stations but 
without much information on media ownership.77 The deputy head of  the HACA, Abdel 
Jalil al Hammoumi, justifies this delay: 
The economic crisis and its impact on the advertising market forced us to suspend 
this plan. We don’t want to approve TV projects which could be unable to sustain 
their operations.78 
72 The ONA Group (Omnium Nord-Africain) was established in 1934 and dissolved in 2010 and suc-
ceeded by another group, Societé Nationale d’Investissement (SNI). The group withdrew seven years 
after the launch of  the channel.
73 The state now owns 68 per cent of  the channel’s shares.
74 Interview with author, Ain el Sebaa, Morocco, July 2015.
75 This is according to the organic law defining the power-sharing system between the King and the 
head of  government, and popularly called ‘what is for the King and what is for Benkirane’. (Abdeliliah 
Benkirane became prime minster and head of  government in November 2011.)
76 Turaya Guaaybess, ‘L’Audiovisuel Public Marocain, à la Croisée des Chemins?’, Inaglobal, 22 
September 2015. Available at http://www.inaglobal.fr/television/article/l-audiovisuel-public-maro-
cain-la-croisee-des-chemins-8530 (accessed 17 February 2016).
77 Zain and Ibrahine, ‘Mapping Digital Media’, p. 65.
78 Interview with author, Rabat, July 2015.
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Most of  the journalists who were interviewed believe the real reason behind keeping the 
state’s strong grip on television is political. According to Abdel Samad Ben Sherif, the 
head of  the TV channel Al-Maghrebiyya, ‘the regime is afraid of  losing control over the 
televised media discourse; the opening of  television channels could create a new aware-
ness among citizens leading to strong new socio-economic and political demands’.79
Taboos: The Game of Ups and Downs
The journalists who were interviewed talk about two main phases of  openness for the 
traditional national media. The so-called ‘democratic margin’ (1997–2003) was triggered 
by the political alternance, a process of  dialogue with the opposition launched by the late 
King Hassan II and leading to the formation of  a political government80 after the 1997 
parliamentary elections,81 with the aim of  preparing for a peaceful transition to the throne 
for his son. This unprecedented political dynamism encouraged the flourishing of  an 
investigative independent press. The 2003 suicide bombings in Casablanca effectively 
ended this phase by re-imposing censorship and self-censorship in newsrooms as part 
of  anti-terrorism policies. The second phase coincides with the outbreak of  the pro-de-
mocracy demonstrations of  the 20 February movement, in which the online press, in 
particular, played a leading role in widening the scope of  public debate. While the ‘red 
lines’ are clearly defined by various laws, the regime resorts to applying a strict interpre-
tation of  these taboos in some phases and allows a larger margin of  manoeuvre in others, 
under internal or international pressure.
During the pro-democracy demonstrations in 2011, major taboos had fallen, mainly those 
related to criticising the King’s centralised powers.82 ‘The main taboo had fallen but it is 
back now even stronger, after the storm of  the political change had settled’, said al Maati 
Monjib, a professor of  history and a rights activist.83 Monjib, who leads a local non-gov-
ernmental organisation called Freedom Now, was facing a travel ban – lifted after he went 
on hunger strike – after being accused by the judicial police of  ‘collaboration with organi-
sations hostile to Morocco’ and ‘diffusing a negative image of  the country’.84 He is among 
79 Ibid.
80 The government was led by Abdel Rahman Youssoufi, the leader of  the opposition Union Socialiste 
des Forces Populaires (USFP).
81 Marina Ottoway and Meredith Riley, ‘Morocco: From Top-Down Reform to Democratic Transition?’, 
Carnegie Papers, Middle East Series, 71 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
2006), p. 6. Available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/cp71_ottaway_final.pdf  (accessed 17 
February 2016).
82 Independent journalist Ali Anouzla published many articles on the king’s holidays and the cost of 
monarchy. Debates about the king’s centralised power were allowed on the state-owned TV channels. 
83 Interview with author, Rabat, July 2015.
84 Yassine Aitmoulay, ‘Maati Monjib: The Cost of  Free Speech in Morocco’, World Post, 1 December 
2015. Available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/yassine-aitmoulay/maati-mounjib_b_8463534.
html (accessed 4 March 2016).
20 Moroccan National Media: Between Change and Status quo 
many faced with a travel ban in a climate of  mounting repression of  critical journalists, 
academics and rights activists.85
Journalists have various approaches to established taboos. The common tactic is to avoid 
tackling some topics or to restrict treatment of  them to the official narratives. The lack of 
information on several topics, such as the business activity of  the King and his entourage 
and the budget of  the palace, makes treating them highly risky in terms of  possible legal 
consequences. Some institutions, such as the army, are a black box.
The continuous changes in the regime’s stance on media freedom, allowing a higher scope 
of  information on touchy subjects before restricting media reporting on them again, is 
best described by the director of  Tel Quel magazine, Abdallah al Turabi:
There is definitely more information in the press today about the palace. But it 
all depends on the decision to open or to close this window. The day they decide 
they want to go after a journalist or a media institution, they will not be short of 
means to do so.86
The lack of  transparency in allowing access to information on topics related to the 
treatment of  these red lines makes any investigative reporting on them highly risky or 
impossible. The information provided on these opaque institutions is mostly the result 
either of  leaks from inside them, reflecting internal struggles between various power cen-
tres in the regime, or of  simple directives conveyed to journalists. Leading journalist Ali 
Anouzla explains:
The sources of  information on topics related to the military, the secret services 
and the palace are not ordinary sources that any journalist can access. Officials 
in these institutions will call the journalist to provide him with information with 
the aim of  directing him to what he should write; it is not the other way around.87
The severity of  the sanctions that could be imposed for critical reporting on touchy topics 
is leading journalists to embrace self-censorship. The dynamism in the political sphere, 
reflected by the formation of  a political government, provides journalists with the ability 
to criticise the government’s policies while avoiding sensitive topics related to the real 
centre of  power:
We sometimes impose self-censorship on ourselves. The important issue for us is 
to survive. We can talk easily on topics such as government policies and ministers’ 
behaviour; topics related to the king, the security services and the army are very 
difficult to tackle,88
explains Taoufik Bouachrine, founder and editor of  the daily Akhbar al Yom. 
85 ‘Muzzling Dissent in Morocco’, New York Times, 18 October 2015. Available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/10/19/opinion/muzzling-dissent-in-morocco.html?emc=eta1&_r=1 (accessed 17 Febru-
ary 2016).
86 Interview with author, Casablanca, July 2015.
87 Interview with author, Rabat, July 2015.
88 Ibid.
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In October 2009, Bouachrine and the newspaper cartoonist Khalid Gueddar received three-
year deferred prison sentences for ‘lacking respect towards the royal family’, along with hefty 
fines for publishing satirical cartoons depicting the royal family and the Moroccan flag.89
In addition to the established red lines defined by laws, social taboos are enforced by a 
mounting conservatism within Moroccan society, encouraged by the access to power of 
an Islamic-led government. The case of  the arrest and trial of  two women, accused of 
‘gross indecency’ for wearing short dresses in a rural area in south Morocco during the 
holy month of  Ramadan, sparked uproar in civil society, whose members took en masse 
to the streets.90 The women’s case was largely debated by the French-language press, while 
the Arabic-language press remained less engaged. The question of  the interdiction on 
fast-breaking in daylight during Ramadan91 sparked no debate in the press, French and 
Arabic alike. A leading editor who prefers to remain anonymous comments: ‘I cannot 
today defend in an opinion article the right to eat publicly during Ramadan. Before, 10 or 
15 years ago, this could have been done but not today’.92
Internal Resistance, Self-Censorship and Moral Denigration 
of Opponents
A complex set of  elements explains the inability of  the journalistic community to safeguard 
the gains it obtains from the relative and sporadic political and media openness. First, there 
is the strong link between media institutions, leading editors and the political powers:
The press linked to power changed during the so-called Moroccan Spring be-
cause the regime changed its approach to media freedom. When the regime was 
back to previous restrictions, the press was back to its old practices; they are even 
used now in account-settling against activists and independent journalists, tar-
nishing their reputation,
said leading journalist Taoufik Bouachrine.93 The prevalence of  the old generation of 
journalists with links to the political powers obstructed the implementation of  a real 
change process within newsrooms, according to many of  the journalists interviewed.
89 J. P. Tuquoi, ‘Au Maroc, Plusieurs Journaux Sont Victime d’une Reprise on Main par le Pouvoir’, 
Le Monde Afrique, 22 October 2009. Available at http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2009/10/22/
au-maroc-plusieurs-journaux-sont-victimes-d-une-reprise-en-main-par-le-pouvoir_1257354_3212.
html?xtmc=caricature_maroc&xtcr=23 (accessed 17 February 2016).
90 Fatima El-Issawi, ‘Blink and You’ll Miss Them: Civil Liberties in Morocco’, Al-Araby al Jadeed, 27 
August 2015. Available at http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2015/8/27/blink-and-youll-
miss-them-civil-liberties-in-morocco (accessed 17 February 2016).
91 Article 22 of  the Moroccan Penal Code stipulates that all those who are known as being Muslims and 
who openly declare not observing the fast of  Ramadan in a public space in daylight without a lawful 
excuse will face imprisonment of  from one to six months and will be fined.
92 Interview with author, Casablanca, July 2015.
93 Interview with author, Rabat, July 2015.
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Equally important are the lack of  enthusiasm among journalists, the fear of  change and 
the entrenched habits of  self-censorship. The traditions of  production within the official 
TV channel Al Aoula are a good example of  journalists’ internal resistance to change. 
The regime’s directives for public media were to give a platform to activists of  the 20 Feb-
ruary movement in open debate programmes, within its strategy to co-opt the movement. 
Fatima Ifriqui, an anchor in the TV channel, recounts:
Journalists could not change, even during this phase of  openness, they had not 
enough courage to tackle things in a different manner, because of  long-lasting 
habits but also because they are aware of  the frequent swings from openness to 
closure [of  the public and political spheres].94
The return in force of  habits of  self-censorship is encouraged by an environment of 
control over the media, using several tools, including campaigns of  denigration against 
journalists and activists or opponents. Legal cases based on private affairs such as adultery 
or the use of  drugs are a prominent tool with which to intimidate those critical and to iso-
late them, by delegitimising them in the eyes of  their community, given the crucial place of 
religion in conservative Moroccan society. The press is used as the platform from which to 
disseminate and sometimes to conduct these defamatory campaigns. The case against the 
rights advocate Hicham Mansouri, who was sentenced to a ten-month prison term and 
a US$4,057 fine over adultery charges, is a prominent example. Being an active member 
of  the Moroccan Association for Investigative Journalism (AMJI), Mansouri believes that 
the real motive behind his trial and arrest is his work on a report about alleged internet 
surveillance of  activists and journalists by the Moroccan authorities.95
The use of  the efficient tool of  moral denigration via legal cases against journalists and 
activists aggravates the environment of  fear among journalists and the need to stay away 
from topics that can annoy, in order to avoid potential retaliation. A young journalist, who 
asked to remain anonymous, describes the impact of  this intimidation on his work:
I am very careful. Most of  the journalists attacked in these legal cases are pursued 
for their personal opinions. I am scared of  the idea that they can be looking to 
fabricate moral cases against me. Professionalism is not enough to protect me.96
The reputational damage that can result from such legal cases is a strong tool with which to 
intimidate journalists, especially those vocal critics of  the regime, according to Fatima Ifriqui:
Independent critical journalists have no real personal life. They cannot meet 
friends in bars, they cannot live their life normally, we are obliged to retreat so-
cially; we are not only scared of  the regime but even more of  the society, which 
can be violent.97
94 Ibid.
95 CPJ, ‘Morocco Jails Press Freedom Advocate Hicham Mansouri’, 7 April 2015. Available at https://
cpj.org/2015/04/morocco-jails-press-freedom-advocate-hicham-mansou.php (accessed 17 February 
2016).
96 Interview with author, Rabat, July 2015.
97 Ibid.
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Media, Politics and the Ideological Schism
The media landscape is one of  the major fields of  struggle between two belligerent camps: 
a growing conservative camp with a strong attachment to Arab and Islamic identities, rep-
resented politically by the ruling party, the Islamic Justice and Development Party (PJD); 
and a pro-monarchy camp proclaiming the values of  secularism. The schism between the 
two camps is mirrored in the struggle for control of  the media discourse between the press 
friendly to the Islamic-led government, adopting a conservative agenda, and the press of 
the opposition (to the government), taking the defence of  secular values and civil liberties 
as a major pillar of  its editorial line. Another schism is noticeable between those – few – 
advocating for new governance independent from the palace and those – very numerous 
– supporting the status quo under the guise of  safeguarding the stability of  the country 
amid regional upheavals.
The solid link between influential media editors and the palace is frequently referred to 
as the ‘mediatic Makhzan’, in allusion to the palace’s ability to control the news agenda 
and its image in the media smoothly through a media elite linked to the palace by chains 
of  loyalty. Allegations about a rise of  media investments close to the PJD are rife, a matter 
which is not denied by editors close to the party. According to Jawad al Shafadi, director 
of  the weekly Al Tajdeed, main representative of  the Islamic party’s discourse: 
There is a small liberal minority controlling the media, they have large economic 
powers but don’t represent Moroccan society; we are in the middle, we are not 
weak but we are not a controlling power [in the media].98
The change in the nature of  the Moroccan press with the rise of  Arabic-language media 
outlets is very much reflective of  deep changes within Moroccan society, according to the 
TV presenter and producer Nadia Hachemi: ‘The victory of  the Islamic party represents 
the rise of  the middle class which was not represented before in the media; our society 
is diversifying and power is not any more in the hands of  the social elite.’99 The ‘war’ 
between the PJD prime minister and the second public channel, SOREAD 2M, known 
for a liberal identity and tone, could be considered as one episode in the struggle between 
the two camps. At the centre of  this struggle is the personality of  the channel’s influential 
head of  news and programmes, Samira Sitail, known for being close to the palace. Sitail 
does not hide her contempt for the rise of  Islamic trends in Moroccan society. After the 
Casablanca bombings in 2003, she gave statements to French television comparing the 
rise of  the PJD to that of  the extreme right in France, leading to an angry protest by the 
party’s supporters in front of  the television’s premises.100 
98 Ibid.
99 Interview with author, Casablanca, July 2015.
100 See the video of  the interview of  Sitail with the French TV channel. Available at https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=RqOUSRF8RSw (accessed 17 February 2016).
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I was always considered as the chief  target of  Islamists. The channel has faced 
pressure from all governments but this is nothing compared to the pressure exer-
cised by the current government,
she said.101 
The dubious relations between the regime, especially the security services, and the media 
are best reflected in the so-called Chris Coleman hacking case. The obscure hacker leaked 
classified diplomatic cables, released on a fake Twitter account.102 Among these docu-
ments were leaked exchanges of  emails between high officials in the secret services and 
prominent journalists. Among these journalists is Sitail, who allegedly transferred emails 
she received from activists in the 20 February movement to the email address of  a high 
security official.103 Asked to respond to these allegations, she simply said: ‘of  course I have 
high-ranking contacts, I have an address book; this is why I am in this position’.104
The political polarisation in the media increased the diversity of  media content while 
contributing at the same time to the decline of  professional trends in lobbying for rights 
and civil liberties. The political manipulation of  the media goes hand in hand with the 
rise of  ‘patriotism’ as the main value cherished by journalists, reflected in the defence of 
the status quo and the denigration of  critical voices in the name of  safeguarding national 
identity and interests:
The ideal of  a journalist acting as the conscience of  the people is not any more 
attractive for journalists, but rather that of  defending the stability of  the regime. 
This conservative thesis is implemented through a continuous effort by the regime 
to orientate journalists,
comments researcher and writer Driss Ksikes.105
Online Press: The Democratic Platform?
The demonstrations of  20 February 2011 were an experiment in the dynamism of  social 
media networks, including news websites, and their ability to trigger action on the streets. 
Central to the 20 February movement was the role played by the website Lakom.com,106 
founded and edited by leading journalist Ali Anouzla. While providing a professional 
101 Interview with author, Ain el Sebaa, July 2015.
102 Ignacio Cembrero, ‘“Moroccan Wikileaks” Rattles Rabat’, Al-Araby al Jadeed, 23 December 2014. 
Available at http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/features/2014/12/23/moroccan-wikileaks-rattles-ra-
bat (accessed 17 February 2016).
103 Yassine Majdi, ‘Affaire Chris Coleman: Samira Sitaïl au Cœur de la Tourmente’, Tel Quel, 30 
December 2014. Available at http://telquel.ma/2014/12/30/affaire-chris-coleman-samira-sitail-au-
coeur-tempete_1428145 (accessed 17 February 2016).
104 Interview with author, Ain el Sebaa, July 2014.
105 Interview with author, Rabat, July 2015.
106 The news site was blocked on 17 October 2013, and a new version, lakome2.com, was launched 
recently by Anouzla. Available at http://www.lakome2.com (accessed 17 February 2016).
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journalistic output, the website employed journalists and activists, and rapidly became 
the main platform for the movement. Along with the news website Hespress, Lakom.com 
acted as a main provider of  information on the movement, but it played also an activist 
role by granting a voice to the movement’s activists and by acting as a focal point to gather 
and sometimes to guide them. 
We found ourselves amid a popular movement calling for values in which we 
believe as journalists, but we did not adopt a propagandist tone in defence of  the 
movement, 
Anouzla argues.107 
The website represents a successful experiment in using social media networks for activ-
ism alongside the publication of  professional investigations on topics considered to be 
untouchable, such as the king’s frequent long holidays or the high financial cost of  the 
monarchy. The scandal known as ‘Danielgate’ is another example of  the website’s success 
in using professional investigation and social media activism in conjunction in order to 
trigger street action calling for change. In an article based on confidential sources, Anou-
zla unveiled a deal between King Mohammed VI and the Spanish King Juan Carlos, 
leading to the granting of  a special pardon to a Spanish paedophile, Daniel Galvin, con-
demned to 30 years for the rape of  11 Moroccan children of  between 4 and 15 years old.108 
A special Facebook page was launched by an activist linked to the website, calling people 
to take to the streets to object to the royal decision to free the convicted man:
A huge number of  people took to the streets. Those were not the people of  the 
20 February movement. For the first time, what we call the silent institution, the 
palace, issued four communiqués in hours in which the King declared finally that 
a mistake had been committed and that he was sorry,
Anouzla recounts.
While the number of  news websites was limited before the 20 February movement, it is 
becoming the major platform for information and lobbying, and the regime is becoming 
aware of  the impact of  such an influential platform. Dozens of  new websites mushroomed, 
mostly adopting a pro-regime editorial line, while some used the online space for defam-
ing opponents. An example is the dissemination by one of  these websites of  a YouTube 
video of  a leader of  the Islamic Al Adl Wal Ihsan group in his bedroom with his lover.109 
The proliferation of  online news projects with a pro-regime editorial line is contributing 
to the further isolation of  the few remaining independent media. In addition to creating 
new websites, the regime is using people to guide the comments on these websites, in order 
to create a virtual supportive public opinion, according to Taoufik Bouachrine.
107 Interview with author, Rabat, July 2015.
108 ‘L’Affaire du Pédophile Espagnol Gracié au Maroc en 4 Questions’, Le Monde Afrique, 5 August 
2013. Available at http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2013/08/05/maroc-la-grace-accordee-a-
un-pedophile-espagnol-en-question_3457450_3212.html (accessed 17 February 2016).
109 The daily Assabah published an article on the arrest of  the leader ‘naked with his lover’. Available at 
http://www.assabah.press.ma/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=68934:2015-03-16-
17-10-36&catid=37:cat-laune&Itemid=782 (accessed 17 February 2016).
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The return to an environment of  self-censorship and fear among journalists pushed them 
to migrate to Facebook, which became a major platform not only for freedom of  expres-
sion but also for information. Facebook is by far the most popular social media platform 
among Moroccans: according to the 2014 Freedom House report on the freedom of  the 
net, more than 5 million Moroccans have Facebook accounts.110 This social networking 
service is acting as the largest political party in the country, as described by Anouzla. 
All the journalists who were interviewed, without exception, said they use Facebook to 
express their opinions openly, to network their work and to connect with their audiences, 
while abiding by the limitations imposed by their editors in their newsrooms. 
The use of  Facebook and other social networking tools, however, is no longer restricted 
to lobbying for rights and liberties. It is also massively used in denigration campaigns and 
in spreading rumours, thus contributing to the decline of  professional standards, and to 
feeding the media with slander and scandals. Nevertheless, ‘although social media tools 
are also used for the regime’s propaganda and for defamation, those using these tools for 
democratic change are more influential by being more credible’, argues Anouzla.111
A National Media Industry in Crisis
The political and media polarisation, as well as the continuous mutations in the ownership 
and operation of  media outlets, is aggravating the fragility of  the working environment 
for journalists. The use of  economic boycotts by advertisers against independent media 
projects is hampering the flourishing of  a sustainable independent press. 
There are seven firms monopolising the field of  advertising. A few phone calls to 
them are enough to stop the flow of  advertisements for any publication, 
argues veteran journalist Talha Jibril.112
It is important to add here that, since 1987, the government has opted for a policy of 
giving fixed subsidies to newspapers and magazines while favouring those that abide by 
official narratives.113 In addition, the intricate link between the private business commu-
nity and the regime makes the pressure exercised by the business community on the media 
even stronger than that implemented by the regime, as Taoufik Bouachrine argues. 
Most of  the wealthy businessmen are loyal to power and use advertising as a tool 
for censorship. We have launched a campaign against these businessmen accusing 
them of  imposing economic censorship on the media,
he comments.114
110 Morocco: Freedom on the Net 2014, Freedom House. Available at https://freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-net/2014/morocco (accessed 17 February 2016).
111 Interview with author, Rabat, July 2015.
112 Interview with author, Rabat, July 2015.
113 Zain and Ibrahine, ‘Mapping Digital Media’, p. 66.
114 Interview with author, Rabat, July 2015.
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The quest for sensational content in the race for larger audiences and financial resources 
led to the rise of  a populist reporting style encompassing defamation, breach of  privacy 
and the spreading of  rumours, or the so-called ‘culture of  buzz’,115 as described by the 
journalists who were interviewed. These sensational trends can go to such lengths as the 
weekly Maroc Hebdo publishing a front-page headline asking whether ‘we should burn gay 
men’, causing heated debate and tough reactions.116
Beyond the sustainability of  media projects, the internal work conditions for journalists do 
not provide them with job stability and opportunities for professional advancement. TV 
anchor and producer Nadia Hashimi explains:
The economic structures of  the media are very limited, which is leading to a 
decline in professional standards and quality. The media industry today has not 
got enough legitimacy and reputation to attract good journalists and to develop 
their capacities; this is why most of  these good journalists migrate to other fields.117
The Syndicat Nationale de la Presse Marocaine, founded in 1963, presents itself  as an 
independent professional association that seeks to uphold the journalistic profession and to 
defend freedom of  expression.118 However, most of  the journalists who were interviewed 
criticised what they perceive as the weak role of  the Syndicat in providing protection for 
journalists and in defending editorial values and standards. The Syndicat is perceived as 
not independent from the current political polarisation and interests.
Conclusion
In Morocco, editorial discretion is tolerated or even encouraged as long as it serves the 
regime’s purposes. It is suppressed when it becomes a threat to the authorities.
The Moroccan media today are more diversified in their content and operation. The 
scope of  topics that can be tackled has extended, and entrenched social taboos are now 
debated. Interest in investigative reporting on socio-economic topics is rising among jour-
nalists, especially the younger generation. However, the ability of  the so-called ‘sacred’ 
topics to resist attempts to liberalise is what makes media reform in Morocco such a com-
plex process, with contradictory trajectories. On the one hand, political and media spaces 
are wider and the media are bolder in tackling topics in connection with the everyday 
problems of  Moroccan citizens, especially in neglected rural areas. On the other hand, 
the severe sanctions incurred for reporting and expressing dissent make the development 
of  a genuine independent press a utopian hope.
115 Tayebi, ‘Independent Press’.
116 ‘“Faut-Il Brûler les Homos?”: La Une d’un Hebdomadaire Marocain Fait Scandale’, Sud Ouest, 
12 June 2015. Available at http://www.sudouest.fr/2015/06/12/faut-il-bruler-les-homos-la-une-d-un-
hebdomadaire-marocain-fait-scandale-1949595-5166.php (accessed 17 February 2016).
117 Interview with author, Casablanca, July 2015.
118 See an overview on the establishment and mandate of  the syndicate as presented on the organisa-
tion’s website http://www.snpm.org/ةلكيهلا -ىلإ-سيسأتلا-نم-ةيبرغملا-ةفاحصلل-ةينطولا-ةباقنلا137-/؟نحن-نم/ةباقنلا
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The ambivalent attitude of  the regime towards press freedom is contributing to exacer-
bating further the fragility of  an industry in continuous mutation and facing an uncertain 
future. While the press historically played an active role in shaking the boundaries of  what 
can be said, its liberalisation was as rapid as its suppression. Gains from the relative and 
controlled openness afforded to the media did not establish solid new traditions of  media 
reporting because this openness was not legally institutionalised.
The extreme manipulation of  the media and the use of  them to send political messages 
are putting professional standards at risk. The most alarming practice is the use of  legal 
cases based on personal affairs in order to delegitimise and isolate critical journalists and 
activists. The use of  the media as a platform for defamation is encouraging the rise of 
populist trends, thus restricting the scope available to the media to debate topics at the 
heart of  democratic change.
The rise of  news websites provides a viable economic model independent from the stran-
glehold of  advertisers and media funders. However, the regime’s appetite for using this 
influential platform to propagate its discourse led to a flood of  new online projects, some 
of  them with dubious standards, further isolating the few remaining independent media.
The dynamic Facebook scene is acting as a two-edged sword: it is allowing a free space 
for the expression of  views and for networking while it is also used as a strong platform 
for denigration and the spreading of  rumours. The migration of  debates from main-
stream media to Facebook is also solidifying the status quo within the former; most of  the 
journalists who were interviewed say they can easily abide by the limitations set by their 
editors, while expressing their true self  on their Facebook pages.
Moroccan journalists work today in a climate of  fear and willingness to embrace self-cen-
sorship. The rise of  the model of  the journalist defending the status quo in the name of 
‘patriotism’ as opposed to the model of  ‘troublemakers’ – critical journalists accused of 
tarnishing the image of  their country – is aggravating the instrumentalism of  the national 
media. The lack of  legal, structural and editorial media reform that is real and inclusive 
makes media freedom a fragile prey for the regime’s ambivalent tactics.
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الاستنتاجات الرئيسية
كرس الدستور الجديد بعض الحقوق الأساسية للإعلام. إلا أن الفارق الشاسع بين النص الدستوري والممارسة العملية جعل 	 
عملية تحرير الإعلام مسارا غير متناسق يتسم بتوجهات متناقضة.
إن قدرة المحظورات “المقدسة” على الصمود في وجه التغيير تحد إمكانيات العمل الصحافي الإستقصائي بالموضوعات المسموح 	 
تناولها  بعيدا عن  القضايا ذات  الصلة  الوثيقة  بالسلطة.  إن غياب  البنية  التنظيمية  الكفيلة بحماية  الإنفتاح  الإعلامي غير 
المقونن يجعل من هذا الانفتاح بنية هشة فريسة لسياسات النظام التكتيكية.
إنعكست الدينامية الجديدة في المجال السياسي في استقطاب إعلامي يعكس الصراع بين التوجهات المحافظة وتلك الحداثية 	 
في المجتمع المغربي. رغم إسهام هذاالاستقطاب في تعزيز التنوع في مضمون الإنتاج الاعلامي إلا أنه يغذي التوجهات نحو 
الشعبوية والإثارة في الإنتاج الإعلامي. 
لا يمكن عمليا  للصحافة الاستقصائية  أن تزدهر في مناخ  السيطرة على الإعلام  السائد حاليا. يشكل فرض عقوبات قضائية 	 
وغرامات باهظة فضلا عن المقاطعة الاقتصادية من جانب المعلنين، عائقا جديا أمام العمل الصحافي المستقل. كما أن عادات 
الرقابة الذاتية الراسخة في أوساط الصحافيين والخوف من التغيير يجعلهم غير راغبين في التخلي عن عادات ممالقة النظام 
في التغطية الصحافية. 
إن استخدام التشهير الأخلاقي في حق صحافيين ناقدين وناشطين في مجال حقوق الانسان عبر ملاحقات قضائية في قضايا 	 
ذات علاقة بالحياة الخاصة ينظر إليها في الغالب باعتبارها ذات دوافع سياسية، يسهم في تقييد التغطية الصحافية الناقدة. 
إن الضرر الذي تسببه هذه الملاحقات القضائية على سمعة الصحافي أو الناشط الحقوقي قد يكون أكثر فاعلية من عقوبة 
السجن في إسكات هؤلاء.
تساهم وسائط الإعلام الحديث والمواقع الإخبارية الألكترونية في تقديم خطاب بديل للخطاب المهمين في الإعلام التقليدي. 	 
كما باتت صفحات موقع الفيسبوك تستخدم منصة للتغيير السياسي. إلا أن استخدام الإعلام الحديث أيضا للدعاية للنظام 
والتهشير بمعارضيه ونشر الشائعات يطرح السؤال حول دور الإعلام الحديث كمحرك للتغيير الديموقراطي. 
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الملخص التنفيذي
منحت تظاهرات “ربيع” المغرب الداعية للديقراطية الصحافة المغربية موسما من الانفتاح لم يتسنى له أن يدوم طويلا. في 
تلك المرحلة، خرجت قضايا تعتبر من المحظورات إلى مجال النقاش العام بما في ذلك نقاش السلطات المركزية للملك. اليوم، 
يعمل الصحفيون في مناخ من السيطرة على الإعلام تغذيه شعارات مكافحة الإرهاب وتعميم نموذج الصحفي المدافع عن 
استمرار الأوضاع على حالها، باسم “الوطنية”.
شهد الإعلام في المغرب فترات قصيرعديدة من الانفتاح لم تتمكن من أن تتغلب على سياسات النظام التكتيكية وتبنيه لموقف 
عدائي من الحريات الإعلامية. كانت مراحل الانفتاح المدروس هذه متقطعة ولم يكن بمقدورها أن تقدم الشروط المستدامة 
الكفيلة بترسيخ تقاليد العمل الصحفي الاستقصائي في وسط الصحفيين. 
استفادت الصحافة من الدينامية الجديدة في المجال السياسي، والتنويع الكبير في الموضوعات التي بات الصحافيون يتناولونها، 
فضلا  عن  تطوير  مجالات  التحقيق  الاستقصائي  في  قضايا  ذات  صلة  بحاجات  المواطنين  اليومية  ومشكلاتهم.  إلا  أن  قدرة 
المحظورات المتضمنة في الدستور أو ما يسمى بالخطوط الحمر –الملكية والإسلام وسلامة أراضي المملكة- على الصمود في وجه 
تيار التغيير، جعلت هذه التطورات الإيجابية ذات تأثير محدود. 
أقر الدستور الجديد للبلاد لعام 2011 حقوقا أساسية للإعلام إلا أن النصوص الدستورية الجديدة خلت من تعريف واضح 
لهذه  الحقوق ولم تصل إلى مستوى  المعايير  الدولية كما أن الاستثناءات  الكثيرة على تطبيقها غالبا ما  ألغتها عمليا.ً تشكل 
الملاحقات القضائية المتكررة في حق الصحفيين -والتي تستند في الغالب إلى قوانين القدح والذم أو قوانين مكافحة الإرهاب- 
سلاحا ًقويا لثني الصحفيين عن تحدي هذه المحظورات الراسخة. 
تشكل حملات التشويه الأخلاقي ضد صحفيين ناقدين ونشطاء في مجال الدفاع عن الحقوق والحريات –الناجمة عن ملاحقات 
قضائية في شؤون خاصة أو حملات التلفيق الإعلامية- وصفة ناجعة لإسكات هؤلاء وعزلهم إجتماعيا. كما أن استخدام سلاحي 
العقوبات القانونية والمقاطعة الإقتصادية- من جانب المعلنين- ضد المشاريع الصحفية المستقلة جعل قدرة هذه المشاريع 
على الإستمرار ضعيفة جدا.ً
يشكل الاستقطاب السياسي والإيديولوجي وانعكاسه على الصحافة سيفا ًذو حّدين: يتيح هذا الاستقطاب تعزيز  التنوع في 
التعبير عن وجهات النظر المتباينة وينشط التعددية في المجال العام. إلا أن هذا الاستقطاب يساهم في الوقت نفسه في استفحال 
استخدام الإعلام كوسيلة للتشويه ونشر الشائعات كما يجعل من السباق وراء الإثارة إحدى الميزات البارزة للإنتاج الإعلامي. 
تسهم التغييرات المتواصلة في مؤسسات الإعلام التقليدي في تفاقم هشاشة ظروف عمل الصحفيين المتقلبة أساسا كما يشجع 
غياب فرص التطوير المهني وقصور الاستقرار الوظيفي على الهجرة من الصحافة إلى مجالات مهنية أخرى. 
باتت اليوم عادات الرقابة الذاتية متفشية بين الصحافيين إذ يخشى هؤلاء ردود الفعل العقابية ليس بسبب ما ينتجونه فقط 
بل أيضا بسبب مواقفهم السياسية. ومع ارتباط الإستثمار في مجال الإعلام بالأجندات السياسية والإيديولوجية، لم يعد الدفاع 
عن القيم الديمقراطية أولوية بالنسبة للصحافيين في المملكة. 
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 الإعلام المغربي:
ما بين الوضع الراهن و التغيير
فاطمة العيساوي
مركز الشرق الأوسط
كلية لندن للاقتصاد و العلوم السياسية
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